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Modern  criminal  investigations  increasingly  rely  on evidence  that  is  not
in a tangible format and can no longer be assumed to be located close to the locus
delicti  or the perpetrator.  This  article  focuses  on the notification  requirement
embedded  into  the legal  regimes  regulating  one  of the available  investigative
measures  employed  to access  data  stored  in digital  devices  –  remote  search
and seizure.  The  article  will  first  analyse  whether  there  is  an obligation  under
international  law to notify the other state about  such a transborder  investigative
measure.  Then  we  will  compare  the notification  requirements  for remote  search
and seizure  in three  countries’  domestic  law:  in Estonia,  the Netherlands
and the United  States.  Finally,  we  will  draw  conclusions  on the principal
challenges  related  to the implementation  of the notification  requirement  under
the domestic regulation. These involve balancing, on the one hand, the difficulties
in identifying the location and the identity of the possible suspect and, on the other
hand,  the need  to provide  the involved  individuals’  protection  as guaranteed
by the principles of fair trial and effective remedy.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Modern  criminal  investigations  increasingly  rely  on evidence  that  is  not
in a tangible  format  and can  no  longer  be  assumed  to be  located  close
to the locus  delicti  or the perpetrator.  Instead,  evidence  may  be  stored
in electronic  devices  located  in foreign  territories  or in cloud  service
providers’ servers. Furthermore, due to the Internet’s decentralised nature
and easily accessible anonymising tools,  the exact  location of the evidence
may not be able to be determined at all.
However, these technological developments for storing and transmitting
data and tools enabling the anonymisation of one’s identity and footprints
in the virtual world should not handicap the efforts of law enforcement (LE)
in investigating crime. In the arms race between LE and criminals, LE must
be  equipped  with effective  investigative  tools  to counter  such  complex
circumstances. 
This  article  focuses  on one  of the available  investigative  measures
employed  to access  data  stored  in digital  devices:  remote  search
and seizure. Traditionally, search and seizure represents a coercive power
used  for accessing  and seizing  tangible  items.  In the context  of digital
evidence  and depending  on the peculiarities  of domestic  legal  regimes,
search and seizure may also be used for accessing, copying and seizing data
stored  in domestically  located  devices  situated  on the premises  specified
in a search warrant.  Remote search and seizure signifies searches  that are
either  undertaken by extending  the original  search  and seizure  to devices
accessible from the originally searched device (and these accessible devices
may  also  be  located  outside  the original  premises  of the search)
or by remotely conducting search and seizure from other (such as the LE’s
own) devices.
Both – accessing data from the initially searched devices on the premises
of the search  or from LE’s  own  devices  –  are  increasingly  employed
in practice by LE notwithstanding whether the physical location of the data
(storage) has been identified, or not.
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The possible  extraterritorial  reach  of such  investigative  measures  has
raised questions regarding their  overall  legality under international law.1
Instead of revisiting this debate, the article will focus on something that has
received much less attention: the obligation of notifying the involved parties
about a search that has taken place. 
This  obligation  is  commonly  enshrined  in the domestic  regulation
of criminal  procedure  with the general  aim  to respect  the principles
of effective  remedy  and fair  trial  as set  out  in art. 13  and art. 6
of the European  Convention  of Human  Rights  (ECHR).2 It  is  generally
accepted that providing notice of a search is an obligation of investigative
bodies,  prosecutors’  offices  or courts.3 One  of the goals  of notification  is
to explain  to the participants  of the proceedings  the objective
of the investigative  measure  and the rights  and obligations of the involved
parties,  thereby granting everyone whose rights and freedoms have been
violated the right of recourse to the courts.4 Such access to the courts would
be  effectively  non-existent  if knowledge  of the execution  of the measure
were to remain unknown to the involved parties. 
In some  countries,  remote  access  to data  may  alternatively
or additionally be regulated under surveillance activities. Similarly, in these
1 E.g.  Goldsmith,  J.  (2001)  The  Internet  and the Legitimacy  of Remote  Cross-Border  Searches.
University  of Chicago  Law  School,  Chicago  Unbound.  Available  from: http://chicago
unbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgiarticle=1316&context=public_law_and_legal_the
ory [Accessed 8 March 2017]; Koops,  B.-J.  and Goodwin, M. (2014)  Cyberspace,  the Cloud,
and Cross-Border  Criminal  Investigation. Tilburg  University,  Tilburg  Institute  for Law,
Technology, and Society, WODC. Available from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=2698263  [Accessed  8  March  2017];  Osula,  A.-M.  (2015)  Transborder  Access
and Territorial Sovereignty. Computer Law & Security Review, 31(6);  Zoetekouw, M. (2016)
Ignorantia  Terrae  Non  Excusat.  Available  from:  https://english.eu2016.nl/documents/
publications/2016/03/7/c-mzoetekouw---ignorantia-terrae-non-excusat---discussion-paper-
for-the-crossing-borders---jurisdiction-in-cyberspace-conference-march-2016---final
[Acessed  8  March  2017];  see  also  Svantesson,  D.  (2016)  Preliminary  Report:  Law
Enforcement  Cross-Border  Acces to Data,  pp.  4-5,  9.  Available from:  https://papers.ssrn.
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2874238 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
2 Council of Europe, European Convention on Human Rights, 1950. 
3 See e.g.  Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik  (Code  of Criminal  Procedure),  RT I  2003,  27,  166;  RT I,
31.12.2016,  46. Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja.  In  Estonian.  § 8(1).  Also  see  art. 94  Wetboek
van Strafvordering  (Dutch  Criminal  Procedure  Code,  DCPC  hereafter),  the Netherlands.
In Dutch.  For  particularly  search  and seizure  of goods  and art. 125i  jo.  125m  DCPC
for “seizing” data. The legal history on art. 126bb DCPC, while not immediately applicable
to search  and seizures,  offers  much  insight  into  the status  of notification  in Dutch  law
in general. See footnote 8 and sub-section 3.2.2.
4 E.g. Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus (Constitution of the Republic of Estonia), RT 1992, 26, 349; RT I,
15.  5.  2015,  2. Estonia:  Riigi  Teataja.  In  Estonian.  § 15(1); Kergandberg,  E.  and Pikamäe,
P. (2012)  Kriminaalmenetluse seadustik:  kommenteeritud väljaanne (Code of Criminal  Procedure:
Commented Edition). Tallinn: Juura, p. 271. See e.g. ‘Appeal against Activities of Investigative
Body  or  Prosecutor’s  Office’  Division  5  in Estonia,  Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik  (Code
of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3.
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cases  the requirement  of (eventual)  notification  is  also  an undisputed
element  of the legal  regime which in addition to the already quoted basic
rights  touches  upon  the inviolability  of private  and family  life,5 human
dignity6 and the general  right  to access  information  held  by government
agencies and local authorities.7 
But  how  is  the requirement  of notification  carried  out  during  remote
search and seizure? When accessing data stored on the territory of the other
state,  would  domestic,  or international  law  require  the notification
of the other  state  or would such  behaviour  be  rather  regarded  as a polite
gesture?  In particular,  do  the traditional  means  of notification  that  have
been  used  to inform  the suspect  regarding  e.g.  searching  his/her  house
suffice in the context  of remote searches?  How does and should domestic
regulation  balance  on the one  hand  the difficulties  in identifying
the location and the identity of the possible suspect, and on the other hand,
the need  to provide  the involved  individuals’  protection  as guaranteed
by the principles of fair trial and effective remedy?
In order  to answer  these  questions,  the article  will  first  look  into
the notification issue from the perspective  of international  law. The article
will  then  turn  to analysing  three  examples  of domestic  regulation
in countries  where  the reforms  of codes  of criminal  procedure  are
in different  stages.  Firstly,  Estonia is  a case  study of a domestic  approach
where  the traditional  search  and seizure  regime  is  not  yet  taking  into
account the possibility of remote search and seizure and therefore illustrates
well the shortcomings of the traditional notification requirements. Secondly,
the Netherlands  showcases  a regulation  which  already  considers
the peculiarities  of remote  search  and seizure,  but  is  nevertheless
undergoing  substantial  reforms.  Thirdly,  the United  States  (US)  recently
passed amendments to its Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure which now
also address search and seizure in situations where the location of the data
has been concealed. Based on the comparison of these three examples we
5 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, footnote 4, § 26.
6 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, footnote 4, § 10.
7 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, footnote 4,  § 44(3). See also exceptions to the general right; see
also  Kergandberg  and Pikamäe,  footnote  4,  p.  328.  Grondwet  (The  Dutch  Constitution),
the Netherlands.  In Dutch.  Article  110  charges  the government  to be  transparant
in the excution  of its  tasks.  See  also  for specific  rules,  The  Wet  Openbaarheid  Bestuur
(Governance  Transparency  Act),  the Netherlands.  In Dutch.  While  the Dutch  Constitution
does grosso modo to provide the same basic rights as the Estonian Constitution, because
of particularities  of Dutch  law  (and the system  being  moderately  monistic  in nature)
reference will more likely be made to treaties such as the ECHR to achieve the same effects.
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will  draw  conclusions  on the principal  challenges  related  to the domestic
regulation  of notification  of search  and seizure  and examine  whether
notification  of a  foreign  state  is,  or should  be  considered  obligatory
in the case of transborder search and data seizure.
2. NOTIFICATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
Reservations  about  the possible  impact  of territorial  sovereignty  are  one
of the main  issues  holding  back  a wider  agreement  on the use  of remote
investigative  measures  such as remote search and seizure,  or  “transborder
access” in terms  of art. 32(b)  of the Council  of Europe  (CoE)  Convention
on Cybercrime.8 Notification  of the state  on whose  territory
the investigatory  measure  is  affected  or ends  up  being  affected  might
appease some of these reservations. However, does such an obligation exist
under international law? Who decides who is notified of what and at what
point in time? 
The drafters  of the CoE  Convention  on Cybercrime  discussed
the requirement of notification as part of the established search and seizure
regime.  They  noted  that  while  not  obligatory  for the Parties
of the Convention,  some states  may  consider  the notification requirement
as an essential  feature  of the search  and seizure  measure  with the general
aim to distinguish between (generally non-surreptitious) computer  search
of stored  data  and (covert)  interception  of data  in transmission  in their
domestic  legislation.9 As such  a notification  prior  to the search  may
prejudice  the investigation,  the legislator  was  suggested  to consider
notifying  the persons  concerned  after  the search  has  been  carried  out.10
Due to the difficulties in determining the physical location of the data to be
searched (or more specifically the storage medium upon which it resides), it
might  be  problematic  to identify  who  ought  to be  notified  at all.  But  no
attention was given to that topic at the time.
8 Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, ETS No. 185.
9 Council  of Europe  (2001)  Explanatory Report  to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185).
Sec. 204. Available from: https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/ Display
DCTMContentdocumentId=09000016800cce5b [Accessed  8  March  2017].  The requirement
of notification was also discussed at the G8 in 1999 but never made it to the actual wording
of art.  32(b).  See  Council  of Europe  (2012)  Transborder  Access  and Jurisdiction:  What  Are
the Options?,  pp.  6-7.  Available  from:  https://rm.coe.int/CoERM  PublicCommonSearch
Services/DisplayDCTMContentdocumentId=09000016802e79e8 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
10 Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on Cybercrime (ETS No. 185), footnote
9, sec. 204.
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In fact,  the explanatory notes to the convention make it  very clear that
the issue  of notification  is  left  for domestic  legislation.  One  of the most
prominent  examples  of domestic  regulation  including  the requirement
to notify another state  about  the remote search and seizure of data stored
in its  territory  can  be  found  in the Belgium  Code  of Criminal  Procedure
(BCCP).  BCCP  art.  39bis  § 3  (previously  art. 88ter)  allows  under  certain
conditions the public  prosecutor (previously:  investigative  judge)  to issue
a warrant to extend a computer search to a computer system or part thereof,
even  if  it  is  located in a place  other  than  the location of the initial  search
performed.  If the data is not situated in domestic territory,  it can only be
copied (and not, for instance, made inaccessible), and the public prosecutor
should  communicate  this  information  to the Department  of Justice,  who
shall  inform the competent  authorities  of the state  concerned  if  it  can  be
identified.11 However,  since  practice  has  shown  that  it  is  very  difficult
to determine  the exact  location  of the data,  the possibility  of informing
the other state has been rarely exercised, even if the provision is used often
for accessing  data  not  stored  domestically.12 Confusingly,  given  the text
of BCCP  art. 88ter  (old)  and art. 39bis  (current),  Belgium  practitioners
in several meetings13 have seemed to posit an approach going beyond this.
The (paraphrased)  reasoning  then  seemed  to be  that  if the information  is
accessible  from the Belgium  territory,  its  seizure  is  not  considered
extraterritorial  even  if the data  is  stored  abroad  as the act  of seizing  is
executed domestically. In other words, it is the place of the LE officer acting
or “looking”  that  is  apparently  considered  the sole  location  of the act
– disregarding the fact  that  the data was retrieved for viewing or copying
from “elsewhere”. 
We  have  found  no  basis  in international  law  for a specific  obligation
to notify  the other  state  about  a transborder  investigative  measure  even
if considerations of comity may be proposed as a reason for states to notify
nevertheless.  This  would  still  not,  however,  imply  that  transborder
investigative measures would be legal by default.  Rather,  we believe that
a unilateral  notification,  whether  before,  or after  the search,  would  not
11 Code d’Instruction Criminelle (Belgium Code of Criminal  Procedure),  Livre Premier,  Belgium.
In French. Art 39bis § 3. 
12 Interview with Mr. Geert Schoorens, Federal Prosecutor’s Office of Belgium, 2015. Quoted
in Osula, A.-M. (2016) Remote Search and Seizure in Domestic Criminal Procedure: Estonian Case
Study. International Journal of Law and Information Technology 24(4), pp. 365-366.
13 Amongst  those:  the Council  of Europe  Octopus  2015  meeting  and the Crossing  borders:
Jurisdiction in Cyberspace conference of 7-8 March 2016.
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impact  the assessment  of the legality  of the transborder  investigative
measure.  Nevertheless,  while  bearing  no  apparent  legal  weight  under
international  law,  the gesture  of notification  may  be  beneficial
for the diplomatic relationship between countries.
3. NOTIFICATION IN DOMESTIC LAW
3. 1 ESTONIA
3.1.1 REMOTE SEARCH AND SEIZURE IN DOMESTIC LAW
In Estonia, the principal provision regulating traditional search and seizure
powers  is  Code  of Criminal  Procedure  (CoCP)  § 91.  Due to the coercive
nature  of the search  and seizure  powers,  it  is  considered as possibly  one
of the most  serious  violations  of the principle  of the inviolability
of the home14 and secrecy of communication.15 
The provision  prescribes  that  search  and seizure  must  be  conducted
for the purposes outlined in law and its objective is to locate an object to be
confiscated or used as 
“physical  evidence,  a document,  thing  or person  necessary
for the adjudication  of a criminal  matter,  property  to be  seized
for the purposes  of compensation  for damage  caused  by a criminal  offence
or of confiscation, or a body, or to apprehend a fugitive in a building, room,
vehicle or enclosed area.”16 
While  it  can  generally  be  concluded  from case  law  and legal
commentary  that  evidence  in digital  form  is  accepted  in courts  like  any
“tangible” evidence,17 it is not evident whether CoCP § 91 would also cover
the search  of the devices  found  on the premises  subject  to a search
warrant.18 Since  the provision  has  been  interpreted  as to  not  allow
14 Eesti Vabariigi põhiseadus, footnote 4, § 33; Kergandberg and Pikamäe, footnote 4, p. 268.
15 Eesti  Vabariigi  põhiseadus,  footnote  4,  § 43;  Lõhmus,  U.  (2014)  Põhiõigused
kriminaalmenetluses (Fundamental Rights in Criminal Procedure). 2nd ed. Tallinn: Juura, p. 312.
16 Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik (Code of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3, § 91(1), § 64(3).
17 Estonian CoCP does not specifically include the concept of digital evidence but lex lata has
been  interpreted  to also  cover evidence in digital  form.  CoCP’s lack of clarity regarding
digital evidence has been subject to critique in recent research. See e.g. Ginter, J. et al (2013)
Analüüs  isikute  põhiõiguste  tagamisest  ja  eeluurimise  kiirusest  kriminaalmenetluses  (Analysis
of Ensuring  Fundamental  Rights  and the Speed  of Preliminary  Investigation  in Criminal
Procedure),  pp.  148-151.  Available  from:  http://www.kriminaalpoliitika.ee/en/analuus-
isikute-pohioiguste-tagamisest-ja-eeluurimise-kiirusest-kriminaalmenetluses  [Accessed  8
March 2017].  See also Osula, Remote Search and Seizure in Domestic Criminal Procedure:
Estonian Case Study, footnote 12, pp. 356-359.
18 Lõhmus, footnote 15, pp. 312-313.
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the digital environment or a computer system as an objective of a search,19 it
is doubtful whether the current CoCP § 91 alone can, in addition to seizing
the device where the data is stored, also be applied for searching the data
located on the device.
However, when applied together with “Inspection”  [CoCP § 83, § 86(2)],
it is clear that CoCP § 91 may be used to access data stored on electronic
devices.20 For example, in circumstances  where an immediate examination
of the evidence  found  on the search  premises  is  not  reasonable  due
to the amount  of data  and the time  needed  for listing  all  the documents
in the search  protocol,  LE  can  decide  that  the evidence  should  be  seized
for later inspection.21 Inspection can be used for collecting 
“information  necessary  for the adjudication  of a criminal  matter,  detect
the evidentiary  traces  of the criminal  offence  and confiscate  objects  which
can be used as physical evidence”, 
and objects for inspection can include a
“document, other evidence or any other object or physical evidence.”22 
Nevertheless,  it  is  unclear  whether  CoCP § 91  alone or in conjunction
with CoCP  § 83,  § 86(2)  would  offer  legal  bases  for remotely  accessing
and seizing  data,  or whether  the CoCP  surveillance  activities23 should  be
employed  instead.  Hopefully  the ongoing  CoCP  reform24 will  clarify
the current  ambiguity  of domestic  regulation  and thereby  offer  better
protection against possible breach of basic rights.25 
3.1.2  NOTIFICATION  REQUIREMENT  FOR REMOTE  SEARCH
AND SEIZURE IN DOMESTIC LAW
As explained,  the Estonian  law  does  not  clearly  regulate  remote  search
and seizure.  Therefore it is  not  evident  what  the notification requirement
19 Kergandberg and Pikamäe, footnote 4, p. 269; Lõhmus, footnote 15, p. 313.
20 Kergandberg and Pikamäe, footnote 4, p. 269.
21 Kergandberg and Pikamäe, footnote 4, p. 253.
22 Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik (Code of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3, § 83(1)-(2).
23 Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik (Code of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3, chap. 31.
24 Estonia,  Justiitsministeerium,  Kriminaalmenetlusõiguse  revisjoni  lähteülesanne  (Initial  Task
of the Revision  of the Law  of Criminal  Procedure),  2015.  Available  from:  http://www.just.ee/
sites/www.just.ee/files/kriminaalmenetluse_revisjoni_lahteulesanne.pdf [Accessed 8 March
2017].
25 Lõhmus, footnote 15, pp. 310, 313.
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for remote  search  and seizure  would  entail.  However,  if we  take
the traditional  search and seizure  as an example,  we would turn to CoCP
§ 91(7).  It  prescribes  that  a search  warrant  has  to be  presented
for examination to the person
“whose  premises  are  to be  searched  or to his  or her  adult  family  member
or a representative  of the legal  person  or the state  or local  government
agency whose premises are to be searched.” 
The search  warrant  identifies  what  is  being  searched  for,  what
the objectives  of the search  are,  the reasons  for the search  as well
as the place where the search is conducted [CoCP § 91(4)]. The warrant will
have  to be  signed  by the individual  to whom  the warrant  is  presented
[CoCP § 91(7)]. In the current wording, it appears to be difficult to directly
apply  the notification  requirement  in remote  search  and seizure
circumstances,  especially  with regards  to the requirement  of signing
the warrant, as LE officials carrying out remote searches do generally not
come into direct contact with the involved individual.
Remarkably,  the regulation  does  not  prescribe  an option  to delay
the notification  for search  and seizure,  such  as is  possible  under
the surveillance activities regime. With regard to the latter,  a general  legal
obligation exists to notify
“the person with respect to whom the surveillance activities were conducted
and the person  whose  private  or family  life  was  significantly  violated
by the surveillance  activities  and who  was  identified  in the course
of the proceedings”.26 
This  notification explicitly  includes explaining  the procedure  for appeal.27
However, CoCP § 12613(2) allows a surveillance agency, with the permission
of a prosecutor, not to give notification of conduct of surveillance activities
if this may 
“significantly  damage  the criminal  proceedings;  significantly  damage
the rights  and freedoms  of another  person  which  are  guaranteed  by law
or endanger another person,  or endanger the confidentiality  of the methods
and tactics  of a surveillance  agency,  the equipment  or police  agent  used
26 Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik (Code of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3, § 12613(1).
27 Kriminaalmenetlusseadustik (Code of Criminal Procedure), footnote 3, § 12613(7).
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in conducting surveillance activities, of an undercover agent or person who
has been recruited for secret cooperation.”
The rest  of CoCP § 12613 regulates  the conditions  for extending  the period
of non-notification.
3.1.3  NOTIFICATION  REQUIREMENT  IN THE CASE  OF “LOSS
OF LOCATION”
Given  the traditional  focus  on tangible  items  and the overall  critique
towards  the need  to update  the current  search  and seizure  regime,
the circumstances where it is not possible to identify the location of the data
to be remotely searched, are not addressed in current regulation. According
to practitioners,  no  specific  internal  guidelines  exist  which  would  help
to clarify  the details  of undertaking  remote  search  and seizure  in case
of “loss of location”.28 It has been suggested that such guidelines should be
established  and different  options  for going  forward  should  be  examined
and assessed  domestically,  taking  into  account  both  national
and international  restrictions.  Any  possible  extraterritorial  reach
of the search (or another investigative measure) should be legally justified,
though  no  specific  proposals  have  been  made.  Circumstances,  such
as danger  to life  or “loss  of location” under  which  remote  access  to data
stored  in another  territory  may  be  necessary,  should  be  determined
domestically and, if possible, agreed upon internationally.29
3.2 NETHERLANDS
3.2.1  REMOTE  SEARCH  AND SEIZURE  IN DUTCH  DOMESTIC
LAW
In the Netherlands,  search  and seizure  for LE  purposes  is  regulated
in the Dutch  Criminal  Procedure  Code30 (DCPC)  art. 94-99  and art. 110.
Depending on the infringement on the right to privacy inherent to that type
of location,31 the competent authority to lead or authorise the search ranges
from any  law  enforcement  officer  via  public  prosecutor  to investigation
judge.
28 Interview  with Ms.  Eneli  Laurits,  Estonian  Public  Prosecutor,  2015; Interview
with Mr. Robert Laid, Estonian Assistant Prosecutor, 2015; Interview with Mr. Oskar Gross,
Police  and Border  Guard  Board,  2017.  Quoted  in Osula,  A.-M.  (2017)  Remote  Search
and Seizure of Extraterritorial Data. University of Tartu Press, p. 60.
29 Osula, Remote Search and Seizure of Extraterritorial Data, footnote 28, pp. 58-62.
30 DCPC, footnote 3.
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However,  data  in the Netherlands  are  regarded  as non-objects  which,
bar  a few  exceptional  circumstances  based  on jurisprudence,32 for that
reason cannot  be  stolen or fenced or seized by LE in the traditional  sense
of the law. Instead,  they are considered a class of their own.33 As (regular)
seizure is a concept limited to physical objects, “data seizure” has received its
own definition that allows for it to be taken into the possession or copied
for law enforcement purposes.34 For the purposes of this article we will call
this “data seizure”.35 
Currently  search  and data  seizure  in the Netherlands  is  limited
to situations  where  physical  premises  are  searched  with the express
purpose of data seizure.36 Computers or data storage devices, whether local
or remote,  are  not considered “premises” and as such cannot  be  the target
locations  of a  regular  search  and seizure.37 If relevant  to the investigation,
31 Under  Dutch  law  a general  stratification  is  made  with regards  to the inherent  privacy
of certain locations. In general, homes are more private than a private building that in turn
is more private than a vehicle and ultimately a public area. The minimum level of authority
that should give the permission is tied to that general stratification. 
32 As a result  of jurisprudence  there  is  a category  of data  under  Dutch  law  that  is  still
considered to be objects. In order for this to happen data has to have similar characteristics
to real  objects.  The most  important  one  of these  is  the fact  that  in the case  of transfer
of an object from one person to another the former must necessarily lose possession of it.
This  is  an uncommon  characteristic  for data  as it  can  usually  be  shared  and multiplied
with losing  control of the original data or reducing its quality. See  Runescape  (2012), Hoge
Raad,   ECLI:NL:HR:2012:BQ9251 and Habbo Hotel (2009), Rechtbank Amsterdam, ECLI:NL:
RBAMS:2009:BH9789.
33 Article  80quinquies  (Wetboek  van  Strafrecht,  Dutch  Criminal  Code  –  DCC  hereafter),
the Netherlands. In Dutch, defines data “as any representation of facts, concepts or instructions
organised  in an standardized  format suitable  for transfer,  interpretation or processing  by persons
of automated works” (read: computers, see also footnote 39). This may also include written
and printed texts. This definition carries over into the DCPC, footnote 3, though this is not
made explicit in the law.
34 DCPC,  footnote  3,  art. 125i  regulates  the existence  of this  special  data  seizure  as well
as the conditions under which it may take place. 
35 A  more  correct  translation  –  given  the discussion  in Dutch  law  about  the difference
in nature between goods and data – would probably “securing of data”. For this article we
will however use “data seizure”.
36 Although if  a premise  is  searched under this  power  and potentially relevant  computers
or data  storage  found  they  may,  under  circumstances,  still  be  physically  seized
for investigation. The Dutch legislator has however indicated that search and data seizure
should be used unless taking the objects is absolutely necessary as a matter of subsidiarity.
Differently put, as long as there is a reasonable option to take just the data, use of seizure
of the data carrier is not allowed. There are of course also other ways for law enforcement
to obtain  relevant  data,  such  as wiretaps  (both  voice  and data)  [DCPC,  footnote  3,
art. 126m / t / zg] and production orders for all manner of data [DCPC, footnote 3, art. 126n
to 126ni] to almost any party in possession of such data.
37 The law references  back  to the articles for physical  seizure  for conditions  and competent
authorities. DCPC, footnote 3, art. 126n to 126ni jo. DCPC, footnote 3, art. 96b, 97.  
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data  may  be  seized  subject  to the same  conditions  and under  the same
competent authorities as regular objects.38
If devices are found during the execution of the search and data seizure
which  have  access  to data  stored  on remote  “automated  works”,39 those
remote systems may be searched as well and any data required to “uncover
the truth”40 seized. A simple example of this might be a Network Attached
Storage  or “standalone” hard  disks  where  daily  backups  of laptops  are
stored. One important limitation is that such remote data seizure may only
take place to the extent that the persons working or residing in the physical
place being searched have lawful access to (parts of) those remote systems.
Differently  put,  if  such  persons  have  unlawful  access  to (parts  of)  such
a remote  machine,  that  machine  may  not  be  searched  in the course
of the search  and data  seizure  execution.  Currently  the law  does  not
specifically provide for remote access outside of the search location.41
3.2.2  NOTIFICATION  REQUIREMENT  FOR REMOTE  SEARCH
AND SEIZURE IN DOMESTIC LAW
Under Dutch law, notification is considered an essential part of civil rights
and liberties  and the obligation  to notify  involved  parties  after  the use
of investigatory measures  in integrated throughout  the DCPC.  The  Dutch
legislator  considers  the duty  to notify  corollary  to the right  to effective
remedy as guaranteed by art. 13 ECHR. 
In principle,  search  and data  seizure  is  done “in the open” like  regular
search and seizure. This means that in standard circumstances no attempt is
made  to (temporarily)  hide  the fact  a search  and data  seizure  took  place.
Contrary  to most  other  investigatory  powers,  for which  notification  is
regulated  in art. 126bb  DCPC,  notification  for search  and data  seizure  is
regulated  separately,  in art. 125m  DCPC.  If any  data  seizure  has  taken
place, the article stipulates all “involved parties” should be notified in writing
38 In practice this requirement is not followed too strictly; however, some sensible (possible)
connection to the investigation should exist.
39 This is the direct translation of the Dutch term defined in DCC, footnote 33, art. 80sexies.
The definition also includes automation such as routers, smart watches etc. Under the new
Computercriminaliteit III (Computercrime III) law proposal, the definition will be changed
to be even more comprehensive. The term however, is clunky even in Dutch, so we will use
more regular terms for the remainder of the article.
40 Dutch police in an criminal investigation are tasked to uncover the truth whatever it may
be.
41 We may,  however,  soon see a testcase where the search is not  formally closed and then
“continued” from a remote  location,  the police  station.  It  then  becomes  a remote  remote
search. It is unclear whether the judiciary would agree to this.
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of the fact  that  search  and data  seizure  took  place  as well  as the general
nature of the data seized data as long as this is reasonable possible.42
In principle  all  relevant  parties43 must,  within  reason,  be  notified
of an investigatory measure. Information about the kind and general extent
of data seized should be  included in the notification as to  allow involved
parties to determine if and how much their rights may have been infringed.
This does not create an obligation to provide a detailed list or description
of all data seized.
The involved parties  that  should be  notified are  the suspect,  the party
responsible  for the data  and the rightful  owner  or user  or inhabitant
of the physical premises searched. However, notification of the suspect may
be  omitted  if  he  will  be  made  aware  of the fact  though  the official
documents  in his  case  (which  he  will  receive  at the latest  at the moment
of his indictment).44
In deviation of the law regulating regular search and seizure the public
prosecutor in charge of the data search and seizure, or the investigate judge
if he  was  the authority  executing  the search,  is  explicitly  given  the legal
possibility to postpone notification of all involved parties as long as the due
course of the investigation would be negatively impacted due to notification
as per art. 125m, lid 2 DCPC. 
3.2.3  NOTIFICATION  REQUIREMENT  IN THE CASE  OF “LOSS
OF LOCATION”
Currently  no  particular  legislation  exists  in the Netherlands  to deal
with the problem  of “loss  of (knowledge  of)  location”.45 As discussed  above,
the law does not expect “unreasonable” effort to notify. Not knowing who
to address  or where  could  clearly  fall  under  this  limitation.  However
from the legislative  documents  it  is  clear  that  cyberspace  and a habitual
situation  of “loss  of location” was  not  particularly  on the legislators  mind.
The legislator  seems  to have  assumed  that  any  inadvertent  cross-border
42 The legislators intent here is not to overburden law enforcement with (neigh) impossible
tasks  such  as for  instance  finding  a suspect  who  has  left  for another  country,  current
location unknown.
43 Explicit  reference  is  made  in the legislatory  documents  to Recommendation  R(95)  13
of the Council of Europe defining “involved parties” with regards to investigatory measures
with regards to data, extending the parties to be notified from previous legislation.
44 More  detailed  rules  apply  in particular  circumstances,  but  are  beyond the scope  of this
article.
45 See  Koops and Goodwin, footnote 1, pp. 8-9 for a distinction between the two. In practice
both meanings are relevant.
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search  and data  seizure  would  be  an exception  and employing  the MLA
procedures the traditional means to be employed.46 
Habitual loss of location potentially adds a new relevant “involved” party
to the mix,  i.e.  the state  in which  the remote  data  was  (as determined
eventually)  seized.  However,  the legislator’s  intent  to create  a limited list
of parties to be  notified is clear in the legislative  documents,47 and foreign
states are not on the list.
However, new law currently being developed is (likely) going to change
relevant legislation with regards to search and data seizure. 
The first  of these  law proposals  is  the Dutch Computer  Crime III  law
proposal  which was passed by the House of Commons in December  2016
and is currently awaiting continuation of the legislative process.48 If this law
passes, remote search and data seizure will no longer be tied to the search
of physical locations. Instead systems or “devices” may be remotely targeted.
After  considerable  debate,  the power  for remote  search  and seizure
on systems or devices has been limited to crimes which carry a maximum
penalty  of eight  years  imprisonment  minimum  or crimes  that  will  be
specifically  listed  in lower  regulation.49 This  is  a significant  increase
from earlier  plans50 and together  with other  results  from parliamentary
46 See Tweede Kamer (2004/2005),  Kamerstukken II 2004/2005, 26 671, nr. 10, p. 23. Available
from: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-26671-10.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017].
47 Tweede  Kamer,  (1998/1999),  Kamerstukken  II  1998/1999,  26671,  3,  p.  52.  Available  from:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-26671-3.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017].
48 All official documents pertaining to this law proposal can be found under parliamentary
file number 34372. An overview of the current state of the law proposal as well as all official
documents can be found at the site of 1e Kamer, where the proposal is currently awaiting
being put on the agenda to be discussed.  Eerste Kamer, afdeling Inhoudelijke Ondersteuning
en  de  unit  Communicatie  & Protocol. Available  from:  https://www.eerstekamer.nl/
wetsvoorstel/34372_computercriminaliteit_iii [Accessed 8 March 2017]. 
49 Eerste Kamer (2015/2016),  Kamerstukken I 2015/2016, 34372,  A p. 5, art. 126nba (1), second
section  and under  d.  Available  from:  https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34372-
A.pdf  [Accessed  8  March 2017];  Tweede  Kamer  (2004/2005),  Kamerstukken  II  2015/2016
Kamerstukken  II  2015/2016,  34372,  4,  p.  5.  Available  from:  https://zoek.officiele
bekendmakingen.nl/kst-34372-4.pdf  [Accessed 8 March 2017];  Tweede Kamer (2004/2005),
Kamerstukken II 2015/2016  Kamerstukken II 2015/2016, 34372, 34, item 17. Available from:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34372-17.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017]; Tweede
Kamer  (2015/2016),  Kamerstukken  II  2015/2016,  34372,  34,  item  25.  Available  from:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34372-25.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017]; Tweede
Kamer (2004/2005), Kamerstukken II 2015/2016, Handelingen II, 2015/2016, 34372, 34, item 26,
p.  17,  29,  42-44,  52.  Available  from:  https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-34372-
26.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017].
50 See the Internet consultation on this law proposal:  Kennis- en exploitatiecentrum Officiële
Overheidspublicaties,  Wijziging  van  het  Wetboek  van  Strafrecht  en  het  Wetboek
van Strafvordering in verband met de verbetering en versterking van de opsporing en vervolging
van  computercriminaliteit  (Computercriminaliteit  III). Available  from:  https://www.internet
consultatie.nl/computercriminaliteit/document/727 [Accessed 8 March 2017]. The proposed
article was at that time known as 125ja Sv (DCPC).
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proceedings  dramatically  reduces  the number  of situations  in which such
a remote search and seizure may be executed.
This  new  remote  search  and data  seizure  is  classified  as a “special
investigatory measure”.  Notification for this new investigatory measure will
therefore be regulated by art.  126bb DCPC, the general notification article
for the Dutch  special  powers  of investigation.  The differences
with the notification for art. 125m DCPC are limited, which is not surprising
as the legislator explicitly took art. 126bb DCPC as the model for art. 125m
DCPC.51 The article  will  still  not  count  “foreign  states” under  the “parties
involved” that  need  to be  notified,  although  extensive  coverage
in the legislative  proceedings  make  it  clear  the government  is  aware
of the issue.
The government  has  stated  during  the legislative  process  that
the Netherlands, when engaging in (potentially) cross-border investigative
activity,  will  in principle  stop  the activity  and notify  the state  involved
when  the physical  nexus  of the activity  becomes  apparent  and is  outside
Dutch  territory.  From  the wording,  however,  it  is  clear  that  this  is  seen
as a matter  of comity  and not  of legal  obligation.52 According
to the government,  the possibility  of “loss  of location” and difficulties
with the requirement  of notification  should  not  be  an absolute  barrier
to (potentially) cross-border investigations.53
At the very  least  this  seems  to be  a new  direction  that  introduces
a divide in the DCPC. For instance, current legislation for placing a wiretap
on a phone when it  is  known to be  active  in the territory of another  state
or when  this  becomes  apparent  during  the wiretap,  would  in principle
require notification and consent of that state.54 
A second relevant  law proposal  is  a significant  redraft  of the complete
DCPC. It is too early to talk about specific content and consequences of this
proposal, since it is unlikely to enter into force before 2022 and its drafting
is  currently  very  much  in initial  stages.  Nevertheless,  the intent
51 Tweede  Kamer  (2003/2004),  Kamerstukken  II  2003/2004,  29441,  3,  p.  19.  Available  from:
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/kst-29441-3.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017].
52 Tweede  Kamer  (2015/2016),  Handelingen  II  2015/2016,  34372,  34,  item  26,  pp.  42,  43,  45.
Available from: https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-34-26.pdf [Accessed
8 March 2017].
53 Tweede Kamer (2015/2016),  Handelingen II 2015/2016, 34372, 34, item 26,  p.  45.  Available
from:  https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/h-tk-20162017-34-26.pdf  [Accessed  8  March
2017]. 
54 DCPC, footnote 3, art. 126ma.
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of the legislator,  as apparent  from the first  draft  put  up  for Internet
consultation,55 does not seem to indicate significant changes to the general
ideas  behind  notification,  nor  do  the plans  seem  to include  notification
of a foreign state when an investigation turns cross-border beyond any such
requirements already existent in current law.  
3.3. UNITED STATES
Rule  41  of the Federal  Rules  of Criminal  Procedure  (FRCP)  regulates
the procedures for obtaining a search warrant in federal court.  The US has
recently amended FRCP Rule 41 so that it now also allows for remote search
warrants  as well  as physical  search  warrants.  Under  the amended  FRCP
Rule 41, a judge can now issue warrants to gain “remote access” to computers
“located within or outside that district” in cases in which the
“district  where  the media  or information  is  located  has  been  concealed
through technological means”
and a search  of multiple  computers  in numerous  districts  would  be
allowed.56 From  the reading  of the new  text  of the law,  which  allows
to target  data  when  the location  of the data  is  unknown,  it  follows  that
possible extraterritoriality cannot be always avoided. 
55 See Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie,  Memorie van Toelichting:  Vaststellingswet Boek 2
van het  nieuwe  Wetboek  van  Strafvordering:  Het  opsporingsonderzoek.  Available  from:
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2017/02/07/memorie-van-
toelichting-vaststellingswet-boek-2-van-het-nieuwe-wetboek-van-strafvordering-het-
opsporingsonderzoek [Accessed 8 March 2017] –  preliminary numbering (these numbers
will change in a later stage of the legislative procedure) section 7.3.1/art. 2.7.3.1.1, pp. 184-
188.  Confusingly,  as these legislative processes are running parallel,  this proposal  is  not
taking into account the changes due to be made through the Wet Computercriminaliteit III
yet. 
56 The previous  wording  of Rule  41  entailed  a territorial  limitation  to the locations  within
the district. See United States Courts (2016)  Current Rules of Practice & Procedure, Criminal
Rules 4, 41, and 45, Redline of Amended Rules, Including Committee Notes pp. 10-14. Available
from: http://www.uscourts.gov/file/21315/download [Accessed 8 March 2017]. See also US
Government’s comments on extraterritoriality at United States Department of Justice (2013)
Mythili  Raman  Letter  to Advisory  Committee  on the Criminal  Rules. Available  from:
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/Raman-letter-to-committee-.pdf
[Accessed 8 March 2017].
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The amendments were target to a substantial criticism,57 cautioning that
such transborder access would result in serious diplomatic consequences, 
“with  short-term  FBI  investigations  undermining  the long-term
international relationship building of the US State Department” 
and possible quick escalation of responses.58 
In terms  of notification,  FRCP  Rule  41  (f)(1)(c)  prescribes  that,  in case
of remote search and seizure, 
“the officer  must  make  reasonable  efforts  to serve  a copy  of the warrant
and receipt  on the person  whose  property  was  searched  or who  possessed
the information that was seized or copied”.
The means  of accomplishing  the notification  may  among  others  include
electronic means, reasonably calculated to reach that person. Such wording
has  received  critique  as it  does  not  set  an absolute  obligation  to provide
the notice  but  instead  requires  the officer  to make  “reasonable  efforts”,
thereby  casting  doubt  to the “constitutional  adequacy” of the warrant.59
Professor  Orin Kerr  has  warned  that  since  a remote  search  is  essentially
a secret  search,  there  is  nothing  about  the search  itself  to provide  notice,
and therefore  this  may  signify  a shift  from a standard  of notice  searches
to a standard of delayed notice (aka “sneak and peek”) searches.60 
57 E.g.  Rule  41  Coalition  Letter  (2016).  Available from:  https://noglobalwarrants.org/assets/
Rule41CoalitionLetter.pdf [Accessed 8 March 2017];  Reitman, R. (2016) With Rule 41, Little-
Known Committee Proposes to Grant New Hacking Powers to the Government, Electronic Frontier
Foundation.  Available  from:  https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/04/rule-41-little-known-
committee-proposes-grant-new-hacking-powers-government [Accessed 8 March 2017]; Tor
Project  Blog (2016)  Day  of Action:  Stop  the Changes  to Rule  41.  Available  from:
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/day-action-stop-changes-rule-41  [Accessed  8  March 2017]
inviting the US Congress to support the “Stop Mass Hacking Act”.
58 Pilkington,  E.  (2014)  FBI  Demands  New  Powers  to Hack  into  Computers  and Carry  out
Surveillance. [Online] The Guardian. Available from: http://www.theguardian.com/us-news/
2014/oct/29/fbi-powers-hacking-computers-surveillance  [Accessed  8  March  2017]. Read
more  at e.g.  Thompson  II,  R.  (2016)  Digital  Searches  and Seizures:  Overview  of Proposed
Amendments  to Rule  41  of the Rules  of Criminal  Procedure.  Congressional  Research  Service.
Available  from:  https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44547.pdf  [Accessed  8  March  2017];
Osula, Transborder Access and Territorial Sovereignty, footnote 1, p. 731.
59 American  Civil  Liberties  Union,  ACLU  Comment  on the Proposed  Amendment  to Rule  41
Concerning  Remote  Searches  of Electronic  Storage  Media (2014)  p.  15.  Available  from:
https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/assets/aclu_comments_on_rule_41.pdf  [Accessed  8
March 2017] quoting United  States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451,1456 (9th Cir. 1986) [citing Berger
v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 60 (1967)].
60 United States Courts (2014). Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure - April
2014.,  p.  252.  Available  from:  http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-
books/advisory-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-april-2014 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
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Another concern was that the new wording gives LE the option to leave
the notice  at the third-party  service  providers  as the (legal)  person whose
property was searched. However, this would not guarantee the actual target
of the search  to get  the notice,  thereby  leaving  him/her  without
the possibility to challenge the search warrant.61 
The government’s  response  to the above-mentioned  critique  explained
that the wording of the provision was chosen to provide a parallel  system
to notices  in physical  searches  where  similarly,  in case  of not  being  able
to deliver  a notice  to the person  from whom,  or from  whose  premises,
the property  was  taken,  the copy  of the warrant  and receipt  may  be  left
at the place  where  the officer  took  the property.62 Upon  government’s
request, the notice may be delayed “only if authorised by a statute” [Rule 41 (f)
(3)].63
There have also been proposals from academics suggesting that in case it
would inadvertently turn out that the subject of the search is located outside
the territory  of the US,  the foreign  government  should  be  immediately
notified  and general  information  about  such  searches  and their
circumstances reported and made public to the extent possible, unless there
are  grounds  to believe  that  that  such  notification  would  significantly
jeopardize  the investigation.64 Currently,  such  an option  is  not  foreseen
in the law.
4. DISCUSSION
This  article  compared  three  countries’  domestic  regulation
of the notification requirement under the remote search and seizure regime.
The regulation  of notification  in none  of these  countries  has  been  free
from critique and as can be seen below may differ significantly.




DCPC art. 94, 94a,
95-97, 110, 125i, 125j,
Awbi art. 2-6, 10
FRCP Rule 41
Somewhat unclear
but generally CoCP § 91
and CoCP § 83, § 86(2)
61 ACLU  suggests  that  notice  should  be  given  to both.  American  Civil  Liberties  Union,
footnote 59, p. 16. 
62 United States Courts (2015).  Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure - May
2015, p. 93. Available from: http://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/archives/agenda-books/
advisory-committee-rules-criminal-procedure-may-2015 [Accessed 8 March 2017].
63 See generally, Thompson II, footnote 58, p. 10.
64 Daskal,  J.  (2016)  Rule  41  Has  Been  Updated:  What’s  Needed  Next  [Online]  Just  Security.
Available  from:  https://www.justsecurity.org/35136/rule-41-updated-needed/  [Accessed  8
March 2017].
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Tab. 1: Comparison of the domestic regulation
of the Netherlands, United Nations and Estonia
Firstly, we observe that the increasingly occurring circumstances of “loss
of location” are  making  it  difficult  for the legislator  to directly  employ
the traditional  notification  regime  designed  for searching  and seizing
tangible  items.  Examples  were  presented  in this  article  where
the notification of the involved parties  would require signing the warrant
which  may  be  challenging  in situations  where  LE  does  not  have  direct
contact  with the individuals  in question.  Particularly,  we  would  like
to point out the difficulties in defining “reasonable effort” which needs to be
made  by the LE  in identifying  the individual  to be  notified.  On the one
hand,  a relatively  low threshold of the “effort” would probably  speed  up
the investigation,  but  at the same time would not aim to grant  the widest
possible  protection  for the actual  targets  of the search.  On the other  hand,
too high of a threshold would saddle LE with an unmanageable task as well
as (depending  on domestic  regulation)  increase  the risk  of procedural
errors.  The more  detailed  meaning  of “reasonable  effort” will  probably
develop with emerging case law. 
Secondly,  we  can  see  that  countries  are  having  trouble  in identifying
the “involved parties” whose rights may have been infringed upon and who
should  therefore  be  notified  about  the employment  of the investigative
measure.  In the cases  of the Netherlands  and the US,  the issue  has  been
under discussion, whereas in Estonia the legal debate has not yet reached
these  questions  as part  of the on-going  CoCP  reform.  We  believe  that
the standard approach should be the requirement to notify person in overall
control of the computer system which was remotely searched or data to be
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targeted by the remote search and seizure. If the actual target of the search
cannot  be  reasonably  identified,  a third  party  service  provider  may  be
notified instead. Notification of all parties of whom relevant data was found
during the search could be considered as an option but should not be a legal
obligation as this may place to great a burden on the investigation.
Thirdly, we suggest including an explicit possibility of a delayed notice
for the notification  requirement  of the remote  search  and seizure  regime,
such  as foreseen  by the Dutch  and US  legislation.  This  option  may  be
connected with specific exigent circumstances and should be accompanied
with further  regulation  on the conditions  for postponing  the notification
as not to allow for avoiding the notification requirement altogether.
Fourthly, we conclude that despite all countries being aware of the fact
that remote search and seizure may add foreign states to the list of parties
whose  rights  have  been  infringed  upon,  only  Belgium  law  currently
requires  the foreign  state,  within  reason,  to be  notified.  Failure  to do  so
however  is  not  considered  a critical  breach  of law  as apparent  from case
law.65 It has also been suggested that prior notification to the other state is
not desirable due to uncertainty and potential delay.66
It  follows  then  that  none  of the researched  states  seem  to think
of notification of a foreign state as a matter of obligation under international
law. Instead it is seen, at most, as a matter of comity, regardless of domestic
regulation or lack thereof. The authors have not found any indications that
the researched countries are deviant from the norm in this respect.
Looking  from an international  law  perspective,  and avoiding  going
into the details  of the debate  of legality  of extraterritorial  remote  search
and seizure, the authors have found no indication of an obligation to notify
the other state about a transborder remote search and seizure targeting data
stored  on the territory  of that  state.  In fact,  the CoE  Convention
on Cybercrime has left the matter explicitly to domestic law. 
Finally, we underline that the notification regime, despite the challenges
set  out  above  must  remain  as an integral  part  of the remote  search
and seizure  regime  due  to the need  to protect  the principles  of fair  trial
and effective  remedy.  Countries  should  consider  options  for making
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p. 228.  Available  from:  http://www.lawcom.govt.nz/sites/default/files/projectAvailable
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the notification  of other  states  more  feasible  under  the circumstances
of “loss  of location”.  One  option  would  be  to develop  a shared  platform,
or use  an existing  one,  between  cooperative  states  where  information
regarding transborder investigative  measures could be shared,  if  needed,
in retrospect. 
5. CONCLUSION
Despite  the requirement  for notification  being  widely  accepted  as part
of traditional  search  and seizure,  following  this  obligation  in the context
of remote search and seizure is not an easy task for LE. On the international
level,  the notification  of foreign  states  about  remote  search  and seizure
of data located on their territory, if they can even be identified, is at the time
being  a matter  of comity  and not  a legal  obligation.  Domestically,
traditional search and seizure regimes may not be  equipped with flexible
options  for notifying  individuals  who  are  not  present  at the premises
of the search or who cannot be easily identified. “Loss of location” that may
occur,  for example,  due  to the employment  of anonymising  tools,  is
challenging  the notification requirement  even further  by possibly making
the identification  of the individual  targeted by the search  unfeasible  at all.
However, given that notification serves as an important tool for the targeted
individual  by way  of protecting  his/her  right  for a fair  trial  and effective
remedy,  the legislator  should  not  abandon  the requirement  as part
of remote search and seizure but instead use the reasonable effort approach.
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